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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is concerned with the issue of how to balance bailouts (or ‘lending into 
arrears’) with debt reductions (or ‘private sector involvement’) in the resolution of 
sovereign debt crises. It begins by briefly outlining the core underlying economic and 
legal problems sovereigns and creditors face in a sovereign debt crisis. It continues with a 
review of recent proposals to facilitate or regulate sovereign debt renegotiations, in 
particular the proposal for a statutory approach to sovereign debt restructuring. We do not 
aim to assess the political feasibility of the proposed institutions for the resolution of 
sovereign debt crises.  Instead, we focus on their likely effectiveness.  In addition to 
defending a sovereign bankruptcy framework we have developed in recent work, we 
propose a major reorientation of the IMF’s role in sovereign debt crises.  
 
The motivation for the discussion can be traced back to the Mexican Debt Crisis of 1994-
95, which gave rise to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout of unprecedented 
size. Since then, there has been a raging debate on how the IMF should handle sovereign 
debt crises. Despite the successful resolution of the crisis and the quick repayment by 
Mexico of all the emergency debt, the sheer size of the intervention raised worries that 
bailouts could cause significant sovereign debt market distortions. These concerns have 
led to a gradual shift away from the assumption that the IMF can and should act as the de 
facto international lender of last resort (ILOLR) by arranging bailouts in response to 
major sovereign debt crises. As is now widely recognized, the problem with a purely 
bailout-based policy is that it requires ever larger funds to be credible and successful. It 
also invites undesirable policies by debtor countries.  The prospect of a bailout 
encourages sovereign debtors to borrow more than they should, and it tempts them to use 
highly risky fixed exchange rate policies as a quick fix towards macroeconomic 
discipline.2  Of course, the worst debtor misconduct can be controlled to some extent by 
imposing conditions on the debtor country before granting a rescue program, but more 
often than not the IMF finds itself in a weak bargaining position at the onset of a debt 
crisis. How credible is the IMF threat to withhold a financial aid package, when a 
potentially contagious debt crisis is about to blow up? And once the bailout has been 
granted, why should the debtor country stick to the conditions it agreed to?  
  
Because of the potentially gigantic financial commitment a pure ILOLR policy requires, 
                                                 
2   The IMF bears its own share of responsibility in recommending such policies.  For critical assessments 
of IMF policy recommendations on macroeconomic stabilization and intervention during the Asia crisis of 
1997-98, see PAUL BLUSTEIN, THE CHASTENING: INSIDE THE CRISIS THAT ROCKED THE 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND HUMBLED THE IMF (2001)  and JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, 
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2003).  For a more sympathetic view, see NOURIEL 
ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS? RESPONDING TO FINANCIAL CRISES IN 
EMERGING ECONOMIES (2004). 
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and because of the moral hazard it may induce in sovereign debt markets, it is now 
widely understood that bailouts need to be supplemented by at least a partial “bail-in” of 
the private sector.  The IMF’s involvement in a debt crisis should be conditioned, 
according to this view, on debt reduction or rescheduling by private sector lenders.  
Private creditors should be required to share at least some of the costs of resolving a 
crisis.  Despite the emerging consensus on the importance of private sector involvement, 
however, there is still considerable disagreement on the appropriate balancing between 
bailout and bail-in, and on the best process for crisis resolution and debt restructuring.   
  
The most ambitious overhaul of IMF policy contemplated so far involves the introduction 
of some form of bankruptcy institution for sovereigns. There was considerable discussion 
and research of this strategy, which the IMF calls a Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism (SDRM), from late 2001 when the IMF first announced its support for a 
sovereign bankruptcy framework, up to the meeting of the IMF’s International Monetary 
and Financial Committee (IMFC) in April 2003, when it was decided to shelve the IMF’s 
proposal.  Despite all the writing and debates, many open questions were still unresolved, 
including the role of the IMF in an SDRM regime.  No doubt these questions would have 
received further attention if the SDRM proposal had gone forward.  But in the aftermath 
of the SDRM debate, no clear new role for the IMF has been marked out and no clear 
rules have emerged to direct the IMF’s balancing of bail-ins and bailouts in future debt 
crises. 
  
As a result, the IMF now finds itself at a crossroads. Should it be content with the status 
quo and accept that it will be less and less equipped to deal with major emerging market 
debt crises? Or, on the contrary, should its size be considerably expanded, possibly by 
granting a more powerful role to Japan, China and other East Asian countries that are 
sitting on massive idle foreign exchange reserves? Or, even more radically, should the 
IMF be scaled back and moved entirely out of any form of crisis lending, to confine itself 
to an advisory and forecasting role, as Chari and Kehoe, Rogoff, and others have urged?3        
  
In this chapter we argue that by establishing an adequate bankruptcy procedure for 
sovereigns, the international community could both fully address the problem of 
                                                 
3   In his powerful analysis of the history of World Bank and IMF lending over the past sixty years, Rogoff 
argues that “my long-held view is that the Fund would serve better if it made no loans. In a nutshell, the 
Fund's current resources of $150 billion seem like enough to cause moral-hazard problems (that is, to 
induce excessive borrowing) without being enough to deal with a really deep global financial crisis. The 
Fund is just too politicized to be a consistently effective lender of last resort, and if its financial structure is 
not changed, there are always going to be Argentinas.’’ Kenneth Rogoff, The Sisters at 60, ECONOMIST, 
July, 22, 2004.  See also V.V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, Asking the Right Questions about the IMF, 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS ANNUAL REPORT ISSUE (1998), who argue that 
there is no need for an IMF role of ILOLR given that the central banks of the G-7 can already intervene 
directly in the event of a crisis.  
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sovereign debt restructuring and redefine a suitable crisis resolution role for the IMF in 
the increasingly financially integrated world economy. Far from stepping away from a 
crisis lending role, we argue that the IMF can enhance its ILOLR role within the 
framework of a sovereign bankruptcy procedure, and without having to substantially 
increase the size of the Fund.  How do we square this circle?  
  
Corporate bankruptcy provides a useful analogy for describing the new role we envision 
for the IMF.4 When a non-financial corporation ends up in financial distress in the U.S., it 
does not, as a rule, seek a bailout from the government. Instead, it files for bankruptcy, 
thus receiving temporary relief from its creditors. This attribute of the corporate 
bankruptcy procedure has been emphasized more than any other in the sovereign context. 
But, in addition to a stay on debt collection, and more significant for our purposes, the 
distressed firm can also ask the court to approve new priority lending, usually in 
connection with so-called “first day orders” that authorize the company to continue 
paying its employees and thus preserve its going concern value.5  When the bankruptcy 
court grants new priority lending it is not extending its own funds, as the IMF does when 
it puts together a financing package for a distressed sovereign. All the court does is make 
way for new lending by the private sector-- often the same lenders that have already lent 
to the distressed firm in the past-- by granting the new loans higher priority status.  
 
We suggest that, just as a bankruptcy court does for corporations, the IMF could play the 
role of granting first-day orders to distressed sovereigns in the context of a sovereign 
bankruptcy procedure.  Importantly, the IMF would not need any new funding to exercise 
this authority.  Thus, a major additional benefit of sovereign bankruptcy is that it could 
open the way for a new enhanced role for the IMF.   This new role would indeed 
strengthen the IMF’s hand, as it would enable the IMF to provide much larger emergency 
lending packages. In addition, it would not give rise to the same concerns about moral 
hazard as the current form of intervention that relies on publicly funded IMF bailouts. 
This is because the new prerogative of the IMF would only be to grant higher priority 
status to emergency lending from the private sector, and since the fund would no longer 
be just extending its own funds, the loans would be subject to more market discipline.  
The private lenders that the IMF would invite to provide the new capital could be 
                                                 
4  Several recent commentators have emphasized similarities between sovereign and personal bankruptcy, 
such as the fact that sovereigns and individuals, unlike corporations, cannot be liquidated.  See, e.g., Robert 
K. Rasmussen, Integrating a Theory of the State into Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1159 
(2003); Anna Gelpern, The Problems of Control and Discharge in Sovereign Debt (unpublished 
manuscript, 2004).  Although these points are well taken, we believe the similarities to corporate 
reorganization to be closer in many respects.  Like the managers of a corporation, for instance, a 
sovereign’s political leadership often changes through time. 
5   First day orders are described in Marvin Krasny & Kevin J. Carey, Editors Reply to an Anonymous 
Letter; Why is Delaware the Venue of Choice for Philadelphia-Based Companies?, THE LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER, March 22, 1996, at 9; Marcus Cole, Delaware is Not a State: Are We Witnessing 
Jurisdictional Competition in Bankruptcy?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1845 (2002). 
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expected to do so only if there were a plausible financial rationale for extending the 
loans. Moreover, the IMF could not extend priority status too liberally without imperiling 
its very existence.  
  
To achieve this restructuring of the IMF’s role, the underlying sovereign bankruptcy 
framework would need to provide coherent, enforceable priority rules.6  In earlier work 
that did not envision this new role for the IMF, we argued that solidifying creditors’ 
seniority rights may be the single most important benefit of establishing a sovereign 
bankruptcy regime.7  In this Article, we take the analysis a step further, to incorporate a 
reconceptualized role for the IMF—a role that would avoid the increasingly real risk that 
the IMF might otherwise become obsolete.   
  
The remainder of our article proceeds as follows.  In Part 2, we set the stage by briefly 
describing the most relevant economic factors relating to sovereign debt and sovereign 
debt crises. In Part 3, we survey and critique the full range of recent policy proposals, 
ranging from increased use of collective action provisions, to mediation, arbitration, or a 
full-blown sovereign bankruptcy procedure.  We also consider the extent to which the 
benefits of the procedure we advocate could be achieved through contractual alternatives, 
and we briefly explore the implications of the recent debt crisis in Argentina.  Part 4 
maps out the new role for the IMF and explains how IMF actions in debt crises might 
need to be circumscribed.  Part 5 concludes. 
                                                 
6 At a minimum this new role for the IMF is possible only if higher priority status can be granted to 
emergency lending. So far the IMF has been able to implicitly enforce higher priority on its own and other 
international financial institution (IFI) loans. However, this de facto priority is partly an illusion as the IMF 
has generally accepted to roll over its loans when the sovereign was unable or unwilling to pay. This higher 
priority status has also recently been tested by Argentina following its default on sovereign bonds. 
Conceivably, the IMF could already play this new role of granting higher priority to emergency loans from 
the private sector under the current legal environment. However, de facto, implicit, enforcement of priority 
is likely to be more difficult to scale up and probably may need to be shored up by legal enforcement 
through the courts. 
7   Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy 
Framework Be Structured? 53 EMORY L.J. 763, 766-67 (2004). 
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2. THE ECONOMICS AND LAW OF SOVEREIGN DEBT 
RESTRUCTURING 
 
A bankruptcy-style restructuring framework can only be justified if proponents can point 
to serious flaws in the existing approach to sovereign debt finance and restructuring.   As 
a first step toward making that case, we begin by briefly exploring the economics and law 
of the current strategies for restructuring sovereign debt.   In the first section, we describe 
and critique the argument that existing impediments to restructuring are actually 
beneficial, rather than problematic.  We then consider several contract and market 
breakdowns that are not adequately addressed by the existing approaches to sovereign 
debt crises.8 
 
2.1. The Willingness to Pay Problem 
 
The most dramatic development in private sovereign debt markets over the past two 
decades has been the emergence of widely held bonds as the debt instrument of choice in 
sovereign debt finance.  While bank loans were the dominant source of external finance 
throughout the 1980s, they were eclipsed by bonds in the early 1990s, and sovereign 
debtors now borrow three times as much through bonds as from banks.  Because the 
bonds are held by thousands of different investors, this shift has significantly complicated 
the process of restructuring the sovereign’s debt in the event of a subsequent sovereign 
debt crisis.   
 
Given that sovereign debt already is difficult to restructure, it is not immediately clear 
why sovereigns have been so willing to issue debt that magnifies these difficulties.  
Several commentators have argued that sovereigns have gravitated toward hard-to-
restructure financial instruments in order to solve the well-known willingness-to-pay 
problem.9  A sovereign’s creditors cannot easily collect what they are owed in the event 
the sovereign is unwilling or unable to pay.  They cannot attach local assets, for instance, 
and most sovereigns have only limited assets outside their borders.  Knowing that the 
deck is stacked against their creditors, the argument goes, sovereign debtors may ask 
creditors for concessions at the first sign of trouble.  Financial instruments that make 
renegotiation more difficult counteract this problem by making it harder for sovereigns to 
renege.  Sovereigns that protect their creditors in this fashion will be rewarded with lower 
interest rates and more attractive credit terms. 
                                                 
8   For a useful, succinct summary of many of the concerns discussed in this Part, with a particular 
emphasis on the realities of decision making by international institutions, see Daniel K. Tarullo, Neither 
Order Nor Chaos: The Legal Structure of Sovereign Debt Workouts, 53 EMORY L.J. 657 (2004). 
9  The leading advocate of hard-to-restructure debt as a solution to the willingness-to-pay problem has been 
Michael Dooley.  See, e.g., Michael Dooley, Can Output Losses Following International Financial Crises 




The suggestion that high ex-post renegotiation costs can impose valuable discipline on a 
borrower by discouraging opportunistic renegotiation is well-taken.  But this insight 
assumes that sovereign borrowers will choose a level of debt that optimally balances the 
sovereigns’ ex ante borrowing costs with their ex post costs of financial distress.10  In 
reality, sovereign debtors have built-in incentives to commit themselves to excessively 
high restructuring costs, rather than optimal ones.  Political leaders often are more 
concerned about short-term issues--e.g., how much they can borrow-- than long-term 
ramifications such as the potential consequences of default, since the current 
administration will usually be gone by the time any repayment difficulties arise.  
Somewhat similarly, current leaders may borrow to further their own goals even if the 
effect is to impose inordinate restructuring costs on the country as a whole.   Finally, the 
fact that excessive restructuring costs increase the likelihood of a bailout in the event of 
financial distress may give the parties another reason to gravitate toward debt that is too 
difficult to restructure.11  In short, there is reason to believe that obstacles to restructuring 
may be more a danger of the increased use of difficult-to restructure debt, than a benefit.  
 
2.2. Confidence and Liquidity Crises 
 
Along with the willingness-to-pay problem, another major concern with sovereign debt is 
that sovereigns may be prone to confidence and liquidity crises.  Just as perfectly solvent 
banks may be exposed to sudden panic runs by their depositors, reasonably prudent and 
financially orthodox sovereigns face the risk of a self-fulfilling debt crisis. The panic may 
be provoked by a contagious failure of another sovereign, as in the Asia crisis of 1997.12  
Or it may result from skepticism by a subgroup of lenders about the solvency of the 
sovereign, generally due to a worsening in the country’s fundamentals.13 Even if the 
sovereign is perfectly solvent it only takes so many skeptical lenders to trigger a run on 
the country.  
 
These self-fulfilling crises obviously can impose huge costs on a sovereign.  IMF bailouts 
                                                 
10   The critique in this paragraph draws from Bolton & Skeel, supra note 7, at 771. 
11   Yet another reason sovereigns may over borrow is for signaling and reputation purposes, as discussed in 
Part III(D), infra. 
12   For in-depth discussion of the Asian crisis, see BLUSTEIN, supra note 2; STIGLITZ, supra note 2; 
LEX RIEFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE FOR AD HOC MACHINERY 
203-208 (2003). 
13  Since the publication of Morris and Shin’s path-breaking article Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-
Fulfilling Currency Attacks, 88 AMER. ECON. REV. 587-597 (1998), it is widely accepted that currency 
and debt crises are due to a combination of deteriorating fundamentals and partially self-confirming 
speculator beliefs about an impending crisis. In more recent work, Haldane, Penalver, Saporta & Shin have 
shown how the incidence of such crises may be reduced when sovereign debt restructuring is facilitated. 
Haldane, Penalver, Saporta & Shin, Analytics of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Bank of England Working 
Paper No. 203, 2003). 
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are generally rationalized as an efficient intervention in sovereign debt markets to 
preempt such crises, and when that fails, to soften their impact by stepping in as an 
ILOLR.  The successful resolution of the Mexican Debt Crisis of 1994-95, thanks to a 
massive bailout, is often touted as a perfect example of the IMF’s role in stabilizing 
international financial markets.14  Indeed, its advocates have argued against a move away 
from large IMF programs towards more private sector involvement on the grounds that 
private sector participation would undermine the IMF’s ability to respond effectively to 
self-fulfilling panics.  Their concerns are well taken if the crisis under consideration is an 
isolated self-fulfilling liquidity crisis. But they become less pertinent if one is confronted 
with a potential solvency crisis,15 or if one looks at the future consequences of an 
accumulating stock of debt, which is increasingly difficult to service by a financially 
strapped sovereign. Alas, when a sovereign approaches financial distress there may come 
a point when the only reasonable solution is to forgive or reschedule some of the debt.  
Private sector involvement therefore can never entirely be ruled out.   As a practical 
matter, the fundamental policy question for sovereign debt is not whether to involve the 
private sector, but how to combine bailouts and moratoria. When should the IMF rely 
primarily on bailouts and when should it involve the private sector?   
 
2.3. Collective Action Failures  
 
If sovereign debt instruments are widely dispersed several collective action problems 
may arise when attempting to renegotiate them. A first obvious problem is 
communication: how to make sure that all creditors are informed about a restructuring 
proposal. Assuming that everyone has been informed, the second problem is that there 
are strong incentives for individual creditors to stay out of the restructuring and free ride 
on the debt forgiveness of others. This is the notorious hold-out problem, which takes its 
most extreme form when individual creditors decide not only to sit out restructuring 
negotiations, but also attempt to collect debt repayments for themselves through private 
litigation. When the IMF decided to change its policy orientation, calling for greater 
private sector involvement as recommended by the Rey Report,16 there was a natural 
concern that collective action problems might thwart any attempt at restructuring the 
widely dispersed debt of the private sector.  
 
                                                 
14   See, e.g., RIEFFEL, supra note 12, at 198-202. 
15   In a pure liquidity crisis, the sovereign has sufficient assets to repay its obligations but is roiled by a 
self-fulfilling run on its currency.  In a solvency crisis, by contrast, the sovereign has more debt than it can 
realistically repay. As the analysis of Morris and Shin, supra note 13, emphasizes it is often impossible to 
clearly distinguish a solvency from a liquidity crisis in practice, as liquidity crises tend to be precipitated by 
concerns about a sovereign’s solvency.  
16   GROUP OF TEN (G-10), RESOLVING SOVEREIGN LIQUIDITY CRISES (1996)(known as the Rey 
Report after Jean-Jacques Rey, a Belgian Central Bank deputy and chair of the working group that 
produced the report). 
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Although the early successes in restructuring the debts of Equador, Uruguay, Pakistan 
and the Ukraine allayed the worst fears about the difficulties in getting the private sector 
involved, concerns remained about larger sovereign debtors with more complex debt 
structures, such as Argentina. At the same time, the stunning success of vulture fund 
Elliott Associates in securing payment from Peru through private litigation in September 
2000 raised considerable uncertainty about the extent of future hold-out problems.17  It is 
these concerns that led to proposals by several countries in the Group of 7 to provide for 
debt standstills to facilitate debt restructuring negotiations and to the call by Anne 
Krueger of the IMF for the introduction of a statutory debt restructuring procedure for 
sovereigns: the SDRM.               
 
2.4. Signaling and Reputation Building 
  
An important step towards the implementation of an SDRM was to be the modification of 
the IMF articles of agreement. In particular, the IMF’s plan contemplated mandatory 
adoption of an SDRM by all members of the Fund, provided that the required 
supermajority of countries agreed to adopt it. The IMF proposed this politically risky and 
time-consuming strategy for implementation because IMF officials feared that most 
countries would simply not choose to adopt the SDRM on a voluntary basis unless they 
were sure that all others would also adopt it. The thinking was that an individual country 
if given the option would choose to stay out as a way of signaling its creditworthiness.  
 
Similarly, other commentators have argued that sovereign debtors may choose to 
structure their debts to make them very costly to renegotiate, as a way of building a 
reputation for creditworthiness.18  Only a debtor that expects to be able to repay its debts, 
according to this theory, would be prepared to incur huge restructuring costs.   This logic 
suggests the structure of many sovereigns’ debt is likely to be inefficient and excessively 
difficult to restructure, thus justifying ex-post policy interventions that facilitate debt 
renegotiations and lower the costs of debt restructuring.      
 
2.5. Over Borrowing and Debt Dilution  
 
Just as signaling and reputation building can lead sovereigns to accept to bear excessively 
high debt restructuring costs, the lack of seniority protection and debt dilution concerns 
can also give rise to debt structures that are too costly to restructure.   
 
Creditors may adjust to the inability to establish enforceable priorities by insisting on 
                                                 
17   The Elliott litigation is discussed in Part III(C), infra. 
18  See e.g., Barry Eichengreen, Restructuring Sovereign Debt, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 75 (2003).  
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priority substitutes such as an excessively rapid repayment schedule, for instance.19 
Again, these inefficiencies can be alleviated through a sovereign debt restructuring 
mechanism that is designed to legally enforce seniority and thus protect lenders against 
the risk of over borrowing and debt dilution, as we have argued in earlier work. 
 
2.6. Bailouts, Private Sector Involvement and Moral Hazard in Lending  
 
Throughout the 1990s, sovereigns and their creditors relied on the IMF’s willingness to 
“lend into arrears” if necessary – that is, to spearhead a bailout – as the principal response 
to sovereign debt crises.  As discussed above, the IMF is not well-suited to serve as an 
international lender of last resort (ILOLR), and bailouts are a better response to liquidity 
issues than to insolvency concerns.20  In practice, bailouts also create a serious risk of 
creditor moral hazard.  If creditors know (or believe) they can count on the IMF to pick 
up the pieces if a sovereign defaults, they will be much more careless in their lending 
than would otherwise be the case. 
 
Mindful of these problems, the IMF has sought to involve the private sector in its recent 
interventions under a “bail-in” strategy.21  Rather than permitting private creditors to 
free-ride on an IMF credit facility (ie, a bailout), the IMF makes creditor concessions a 
pre-condition of its willingness to lend (the bail-in).  Only if the private creditors agree to 
restructure the sovereign’s obligations, the IMF announces, will it agree to coordinate a 
bailout. 
 
Although the strategy is promising in some respects, such as its recognition of the need 
for private sector participation, it has several serious – indeed, potentially fatal – 
limitations.  First, the strategy requires a significant reorientation of the usual sequence of 
responses to a sovereign debt crisis.  In previous crises, the IMF has taken the lead, and 
private creditors have relied on the IMF’s assessment to shape their responses.  Under a 
bail-in, the IMF in some respects plays follower rather than leader.22  Second, the bail-in 
strategy doesn’t address the need for a coherent seniority structure.  It provides no 
guidance on the order in which the sovereign’s debt should be restructured, for instance, 
which leaves open the risk that ostensible priority rankings will be ignored, as in 
                                                 
19 Bolton and Jeanne provide a formal analysis of inefficient de facto seniority achieved through debt that is 
difficult to restructure.  Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt 
(NBER discussion paper, 2005). 
20   See supra 2.2. 
21   The bail-in strategy is described in detail in ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 2; and BARRY J. 
EICHENGREEN & CHRISTOF RUEHL, THE BAIL-IN PROBLEM: SYSTEMATIC GOALS, AD HOC 
MEANS 16-17 (unpublished manuscript, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-228127. 
22   For a discussion of the problems with this reorientation, see Eichengreen & Ruehl, supra note 21. 
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Ecuador’s restructuring in 1999.23  The final, and most important, problem is credibility.  
It is difficult for the IMF to credibly commit that it will not provide a bailout, particularly 
at times when there are concerns about contagion.  Outside the few recent cases of very 
small countries that have been pressured to restructure their debt, there are few instances 
when the IMF decided to withhold funding, and when it did, it generally only did so 
following the failure of several previous programs, as with Russia in 1998 and Argentina 
in 2001. When creditors can reasonably expect such IMF forbearance, they will prefer to 
gamble on an IMF rescue, as they did in Russia and Argentina, rather than agree to make 
concessions to avert a debt crisis.  And private creditors’ intransigence only exacerbates 
the pressure for the IMF to step in with a bailout. 
 
The question, then, is this: what alternative solutions are available and should be 
considered?  It is to this question that we now turn. 
                                                 
23   Equador subverted the ostensible priority of its collateralized Brady Bonds by negotiating to restructure 
these bonds first, before turning to its other debt.  Id. at 16-17. 
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3. CONTRACTS AND AD HOC NEGOTIATION: NEW AND 
EXISTING STRATEGIES 
 
The previous section cataloged the principal economic factors bearing on sovereign debt 
and sovereign debt crises.  In this section, we explore the innovations that have been 
introduced recently and the continuing experiences under the existing market-based 
approach. We begin with a discussion of the collective action clauses (CACs), followed 
by concerns about creditor seniority in restructuring. We end with a discussion of lessons 
that can be gleaned from the recent crisis in Argentina.  
 
3.1. Collective Action Provisions (CACs) 
 
By just about any yardstick, the most successful of the recent proposals has been the call 
to encourage sovereigns to include collective action provisions in the bonds they issue.  
The bonds governed by U.K. law have long included voting provisions that permit a 
specified majority of bondholders to adjust payment or interest terms in the event of a 
debt crisis.  Bonds governed by New York law, by contrast, have traditionally given each 
bondholder the right to decide whether or not to agree to a restructuring.  In the 1990s, an 
increasing number of commentators concluded that this “unanimity” approach makes 
restructuring too difficult.   To facilitate coordination among the sovereign’s 
bondholders, and to counteract the threat of holdouts, they argued, sovereign debtors 
should include CAC’s in all of their bonds.24 
 
Perhaps the most dramatic recent development in international finance has been the 
stunning success of the campaign to introduce CAC’s into New York governed sovereign 
debt.  In early-2003, shortly before the IMF formally jettisoned its proposal for a 
sovereign bankruptcy regime, Mexico very publicly issued New York-registered bonds 
that permit changes to the payment terms with the consent of 75% of the holders.  Within 
a few weeks, several other sovereigns had followed suit, including Argentina and Brazil.  
Since the end of 2003, nearly every new issuance of sovereign bonds has featured a 
CAC.25  Nor have these innovations been limited to the existence of a voting provision 
alone.   The bonds issued by Mexico and CACs introduced by Uruguay when it 
                                                 
24  An early, influential emphasis on CACs came in Barry Eichengreen & Richard Portes, Crisis? What 
Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors, in CRISIS?  WHAT CRISIS? ORDERLY WORKOUTS 
FOR SOVEREIGN DEBTORS 3, 49 (1995).   More recently, Mitu Gulati has written extensively about the 
use and promise of CAC’s.  See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the 
Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317 (2002).  For a nuanced view of the choice between CAC’s and the 
unanimity approach, see William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best 
Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. (2004). 
25   These developments are recounted and analyzed in Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in 
Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929 (2004); 
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129 (2006). 
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“reprofiled” its debt disenfranchise bonds that are owned by the sovereign issuer and its 
public sector instrumentalities, in order to prevent the sovereign from manipulating the 
voting process.   Even more importantly, the Uruguayan bonds include an aggregation 
clause that permits a combined vote of all the classes of bonds that include the clause.  
The clause is designed to obviate the need for separate votes for each class of bonds by 
creating the possibility of a single, inter-class vote on the terms of a restructuring.26 
 
The new collective action clause consensus is ushering in a regime that looks much like 
the world that many commentators have been calling for.  If their vision is accurate, there 
will be no need for significant additional reforms.  But there are several reasons to 
suspect that CAC enthusiasts have oversold the virtues of the new clauses.  First, CAC’s 
are more effective for restructuring one or a small number of classes of bonds, than for 
sovereign debtors with a more complicated capital structure.27  Uruguay’s aggregation 
provision is designed to counteract this limitation by lumping several bond issuances into 
a single class for voting purposes.  But the provision is untested; it remains to be seen 
whether the aggregation strategy will work.  Moreover, the aggregation clause, as with 
CAC’s generally, seem more promising for restructuring a small group of similar classes 
of bonds than for a more complicated capital structure. 
 
Second, although CACs counteract the collective action and holdout problems, they leave 
several other sovereign debt issues untouched.  One of the most important shortcomings 
of the sovereign debt markets is the absence of an enforceable priority structure.  As 
noted earlier, creditors’ inability to create enforceable priorities introduces serious 
inefficiencies, such as the risk of debt dilution.  A CAC-based approach does nothing to 
remedy the priority problem.  CAC’s also do not address concerns such as the need for a 
standstill while the sovereign debtor is renegotiating its obligations.28 
 
Ironically enough, given the hoopla surrounding the widespread inclusion of CAC’s in 
New York-governed bonds, it is not entirely clear that CAC’s will significantly affect the 
restructuring even of the bonds that now include them.  Ecuador’s 1999 restructuring 
showed that sovereign debt can be scaled down through the use of exit consents– that is, 
an exchange offer that is combined with a vote by the exiting bondholders to alter in 
detrimental fashion the nonpayment terms of any bonds that are not exchanged in the 
offer.29  Although exit consents are a strategy for restructuring bonds in the absence of 
                                                 
26   For a brief description of the Uruguay provision, see G. Mitu Gulati & David Skeel, Collective Action 
Consensus? (unpublished manuscript, 2003). 
27   This point is discussed in more detail in David A. Skeel, Jr., Can Majority Voting Provisions Do it All?, 
52 EMORY L.J. 417 (2002). 
28   These and additional shortcomings are discussed in Bolton & Skeel, supra note 7, at 773-76. 
29   The exit consent strategy was described in Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in 
Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. REV. 59 (2000).  Buchheit served as counsel for Ecuador in the 
restructuring shortly after the article was initially drafted. 
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CACs, they have been employed even with bonds that included a voting provision.  Thus, 
in addition to being only a partial solution to the shortcomings of the sovereign debt 
markets, CACs may not even prove to be the mechanism of choice for restructuring 
individual classes of bonds. 
 
3.2. Changing and Enforcing Seniority  
 
Although most commentators have focused on collective action problems, an equally 
important problem is debt dilution and the lack of enforcement of seniority in sovereign 
debt. That is, in the absence of enforceable priorities, when a debtor country approaches 
financial distress any new debt it issues is partly at the expense of existing creditors who 
face a greater risk of default and will have to accept a greater “haircut” (or debt 
reduction) in the event of default, since the total resources the debtor can muster towards 
repayment of its stock of debt will have to be divided pro-rata among all its creditors, old 
and new.  In earlier work, we have argued that the lack of enforcement of an absolute 
priority rule encourages over-borrowing by the sovereign as it approaches financial 
distress and also raises its overall cost of borrowing.30  
 
The shift in IMF policy towards greater private sector involvement, which was first 
signaled by the IMF during the Russian debt crisis of 1998 when it abandoned its bailout 
effort, magnified the uncertainty by upsetting market expectations concerning implicit 
seniority.  Two subsequent events roiled the waters still further: the debt restructuring of 
Pakistan in 1999-2000, and the decision by the Court of Appeals of Brussels in 2000 to 
grant Elliott Associates, a vulture fund that had invested in Peruvian debt, a restraining 
order against Euroclear preventing it from accepting transfers from the Peruvian 
government towards paying other creditors before Elliott’s debt claims on Peru had been 
honored.31 
 
The first event, Pakistan’s debt restructuring agreement of 2000, required for the first 
time that Eurobond holders be included in the restructuring agreement, thus shattering the 
market’s perception that these debts had higher priority status.32 The second event, Elliott 
Associates vs. Peru, alerted the market to the potentially far-reaching possibilities that the 
traditional interpretation of the standard pari passu clause in sovereign bond issues might 
                                                 
30 Bolton & Skeel, supra note 7, at 791-93.  Bolton & Jeanne, supra note 19, provides a formal analysis of 
optimal debt structure in the absence of any legal enforcement of seniority. They show that creditors 
attempt to achieve higher priority de facto by making their debt difficult to restructure. Overall this results 
in an excessively high cost of financial distress.     
31 Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 366 (2d Cir. 1999). 
32  See Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Case for an Explicit Seniority Structure in Sovereign Debt (IMF, 
Research Department, Working Paper draft, Sept. 29, 2003); Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seating 
Chart for Sovereign Restructurings, 53 EMORY L.J. 1115 (2004). 
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no longer be valid,33 and that private litigants could threaten to disrupt the transfer of 
funds from sovereigns to creditors by obtaining restraining orders in court.     
  
The new uncertainty as to which types of sovereign debt will or won’t be subject to 
restructuring, and as to the meaning of the ubiquitous pari passu clause, has propelled the 
issue of priority and debt seniority to the forefront of discussions about sovereign finance.  
Before examining how debt seniority can best be enforced, we begin by describing the 
Elliott decision and the legal debate surrounding it in more detail. 
 
Elliott Associates, playing an aggressive hold-out strategy, refused to go along with 
Peru’s proposed Brady Plan debt restructuring of 1995. Instead, it attempted to obtain 
repayment on its debt by initiating a series of lawsuits and eventually prevailed in the 
Court of Appeals of Brussels in September 2000. Eager to avoid a default on its Brady 
bonds, the Peruvian Government decided to settle following the Court’s decision by 
paying Elliott in full.34  
 
Underlying the Brussels court’s decision was a seemingly straightforward interpretation 
of the pari passu clause. The clause states that “[t]he obligations of the Guarantor 
hereunder [the Peruvian Government] do rank and will rank at least pari passu in priority 
of payment with all other External Indebtedness of the Guarantor, and interest thereon.”35  
The court interpreted this language as meaning that when the debtor is unable to repay all 
its debts in full, all claims of equal ranking under the pari passu clause should get a pro 
rata share of the total amount the debtor pays out. Most importantly, the court deemed 
that the debtor cannot pay some creditors in full (the creditors who agreed to the 
restructuring) and default on others (the creditors who held out and retained their original 
bonds). It is on the basis of this interpretation that the court granted Elliott Associates a 
restraining order against Euroclear, the entity to which Peru had wired funds to pay 
consenting bondholders the scaled down amounts they had agreed to accept.36 
  
The court’s interpretation provoked a torrent of criticism.37  Most commentators favor an 
alternative interpretation of the pari passu clause, that it is designed to prevent the 
                                                 
33   The competing interpretations of the pari passu clause are described below.  See infra notes 35-37 and 
accompanying text. 
34   G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 BUS. L. 635 (2001). 
35  See Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14169 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2000) 
and Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Republic of Peru, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 368 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2000). 
36  In effect, Elliott claimed that it was entitled both to claim its share of the payments being made to 
consenting bondholders, and (unlike the consenters) to continue to insist on payment of the full face 
amount of its bonds. 
37  For critiques of the Elliott ruling, see, e.g., Gulati & Klee, supra note 34; Lee C. Buchheit and Jeremiah 
S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869 (2004).  For a 
somewhat more sympathetic interpretation, see William W. Bratton, Pari Passu and a Distressed 
Sovereign’s Rational Choices, 53 EMORY L.J. 823 (2004). 
15 
 
borrower from issuing new debt that is senior to the existing debt. Which interpretation 
the courts will end up adopting in the future is still uncertain, although in light of the 
outpouring of academic writing and briefs following the Brussels Court of Appeals 
decision, the narrower interpretation favored by legal scholars seems likely to prevail.  
      
Lost in the hang-wringing over the novel interpretation of the boilerplate pari passu 
clause by the Brussels Court of Appeals is the possibility that the court’s remedy could 
open up a new strategy for the enforcement of sovereign debt payments, with far-
reaching consequences that no-one had conceived of before.  Crucial to this possibility is 
the fact that the court granted a restraining order against Euroclear, rather than limiting 
itself to a judgment against Peru. 
 
To appreciate the implications, start with Gulati and Klee’s ominous warning that: 
 
  What the Brussels decision does is to put a large hammer in the hands of holdout 
 creditors, thereby enabling them to cause even more disruption in restructurings. 
 Those inclined to be holdouts have a stronger position, and it encourages others to 
 hold out. For the sovereigns and, we argue, for the majority of creditors, this is a 
 nightmarish situation.38  
 
The restraining order does indeed amount to a big stick for creditors, which plausibly 
should not be put in the hands of holdout creditors.  Interesting new possibilities, 
however, can be imagined if one thinks of this stick as potentially applying to the 
enforcement of debt payments and seniority more generally.  If creditors’ inability to 
seize assets and a sovereign’s limited capacity to issue collateralized debt interfere with a 
sovereign’s ability to borrow, then an effective way of relaxing the sovereign’s 
borrowing constraint may be to give creditors the means to credibly threaten to shut out a 
defaulting sovereign from international financial markets by preventing it from paying 
off new creditors.    
 
The greater enforcement powers opened up by Elliott-type injunctions have inspired 
several commentators to outline the contours of a contractual approach to the 
enforcement of seniority in sovereign debt. One suggestion, put forward by both 
Zettelmeyer and Gelpern, is for senior creditors to enforce the priority ostensibly granted 
to them by a sovereign debtor vis-à-vis other, junior creditors pursuant to a “third party 
beneficiary” theory.  Junior creditors would agree to subordinate their claims, and courts 
might agree to enforce the subordination, based on the theory that the junior creditors 
could be construed as beneficiaries of the financing from the senior creditor.39  Another 
                                                 
38   Gulati & Klee, supra note 34, at 638. 
39   Zettlemeyer, supra note 32; Gelpern, supra note 32. 
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suggestion, first offered by Wood, is to contractually require the sovereign to include 
senior creditors as parties in subsequent junior debt issues.40   If sovereign debtors began 
to include these kinds of subordination arrangements in their debt contracts, one could 
conceive of Elliot-type injunctions that courts might grant to senior creditors against a 
sovereign that later attempted to violate the terms of the earlier agreement.  If a sovereign 
debtor that had agreed to subordinate any subsequent debt failed to do so, a creditor could 
ask a court to injoin the new issuance.     
While such remedies might conceivably discipline sovereigns and open the way for the 
contractual enforcement of an absolute priority rule for sovereign debt, the critical issue 
remains whether the cure is not likely to be worse than the disease. There is a real 
potential for nightmarish disruptions to the payment system, and one could imagine a 
multiplication of costly legal actions between creditors. In addition, this strategy would 
impose a continuous monitoring burden on the senior creditors.  Because any 
subordination clause included in a creditor’s contract with the borrower could not bind a 
subsequent third party borrower who might be ignorant about the priority arrangement, 
the senior creditor would be forced to police to make sure that the sovereign included a 
subordination provision in each subsequent debt issuance.41    
We do not mean to discourage these contractual innovations.  We believe that they 
represent an important step forward in the effort to improve sovereign debt markets.  But 
it is important to recognize that the contractual approach also brings important risks. 
 
3.3. Appraising Argentina’s Debt Restructuring Challenges  
 
It took only three months after a final futile attempt by the IMF to rescue Argentina in 
September 2001 and after a desperate move by the Argentine government to restructure 
its domestic debt, for Argentina to face the inevitable and declare a default on its foreign 
debt. Argentina’s dramatic default also pronounced the end of its nearly decade-long 
currency board experiment, resulting in a rapid and substantial depreciation of the peso, 
which precipitated a systemic bank run. The new government hastily responded with a 
general freeze on bank deposits that lasted for over half a year, with devastating effects 
on the economy. The dislocation of the Argentine economy, which had been in recession 
for 45 months before the default, was so great that GDP contracted by roughly 20% in 
                                                 
40   PHILIP R. WOOD, THE LAW OF SUBORDINATED DEBT (1990). 
41  If the priority arrangement were somehow deemed to be binding on a subsequent creditor, the higher 
‘due diligence’ burden would fall on new lenders, who would need to determine what the stock of 
outstanding senior debts was before making a loan.  Short of setting up a central register of senior debt that 
could be easily accessed by new lenders this would often be an impossible task. 
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2002, with a predictably sharp increase in poverty and unemployment.42  
   
Understandably, in the midst of an economic crisis of such magnitude and the associated 
political turmoil, external debt restructuring was not a priority for the Argentine 
government in 2002. Creditors were also reluctant to initiate negotiations at a time when 
the economy and Argentina’s perceived ability to repay its external debt were at their 
lowest.   
 
While Argentina was undergoing the worst economic crisis in its history, commentators 
in the debate on the SDRM sometimes pointed to Argentina as a test case, which would 
vindicate advocates of a contractual approach to sovereign debt restructuring and show 
that it was possible to orchestrate a voluntary debt restructuring successfully in a short 
period of time. Unlike the few prior cases of successful debt restructuring such as 
Pakistan, the Ukraine and Ecuador, the size and complexity of Argentina’s external debt 
restructuring problem, involving multiple bond issues held by hundreds of thousands of 
creditors all over the world and adding up to nearly $90 billion total face value of debt, 
would truly put the contractual approach to the test. Could a voluntary restructuring of 
such magnitude and involving so many creditors be completed successfully in a 
reasonable amount of time? And could Argentina avoid falling prey to holdout creditors 
and to the uncoordinated legal actions of multiple creditor groups? 
 
Advocates of a contractual approach argued that the risk of private litigation and the 
potentially disruptive consequences of court rulings in the wake of Elliott Associates vs. 
Peru were highly exaggerated and predicted that no US or English court would grant 
Elliott-type injunctions to Argentine creditors. They also maintained that once 
negotiations started and an offer was on the table the contracting parties would be able to 
reach a swift agreement without undue delays. The only source of delay, they maintained, 
was due to the Argentine government dragging its feet and refusing to initiate 
negotiations. They argued, furthermore, that a statutory mechanism for debt restructuring, 
as envisioned by the IMF, would fare just as poorly in inducing the Argentine 
government to the negotiating table.   
 
Their predictions have only partially been borne out by events.  The risk of private 
litigation did indeed turn out to be less important than many commentators had feared. 
There were fewer law suits than expected and the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York in particular, where several actions against Argentina were brought, 
showed considerable restraint and willingness to first give negotiations a chance.43 The 
                                                 
The case is treated in detail in Mario Damill, Roberto Frenkel, & Martin Rapetti, The Argentinean Debt: 
History, Default and Restructuring, this volume. 
43   Miller and Thomas argue that the U.S. federal judge who handled much for the litigation cleverly 
orchestrated the process that led to Argentina’s eventual exchange through his sequence of decisions, 
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court also ruled in favor of Argentina in limiting creditors’ ability to seize Argentine 
assets in the US, such as Argentine military assets and Argentine payments to 
Argentina’s Embassy.44  Still, the same court had earlier certified a class-action suit by a 
group of creditors and granted these creditors the right to attach Argentina's commercial 
assets worldwide. Partly in response to this ruling Argentina had to take several 
precautionary steps to protect its assets, such as transferring funds to its Embassies 
through channels outside the banking system, and temporarily re-nationalizing the Postal 
service to preempt the attachment of Postal service assets abroad. While clearly 
disruptive, these steps have not imposed substantial costs on Argentina as could have 
been feared.  
 
Where the predictions of advocates of an ad hoc approach were confounded is on the 
likely ease and speed of the voluntary restructuring approach. Argentina’s experience in 
the four years following the declaration of default on its external debt underscored the 
difficulties and inefficiencies of a contractual approach, and provides support for the 
more interventionist policy envisioned by the IMF under the SDRM.  Indeed, four years 
passed before Argentina completed an exchange offer to restructure its debt, and 
uncertainty remains even now due to the fact that a significant percentage of claims 
rejected the offer.45  Argentina has vowed not to repay any of the dissenting claims, but 
the claims technically remain outstanding. 
 
The four years of delay are not entirely attributable to the reluctance by the Argentine 
government to negotiate. A first offer in September of 2003 to write off 75 per cent of the 
nominal value of the debt had been flatly rejected by creditors as too low, especially in 
light of the promising signs of recovery of the economy in the early months of 2003.  
After the collapse of this first round of negotiations, creditors did not sit still. Many small 
holders of Argentine bonds, mainly based in Europe, organized themselves under the 
Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders (GCAB) – a bondholder committee seeking 
to represent dispersed bondholders in direct negotiations with the Argentine government. 
But there were never any direct, formal negotiations between the GCAB or any other 
representative bondholder committee in the two subsequent years.46  Indeed, with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
several of which are described in the text.  Marcus Miller & Dania Thomas, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: 
The Judge, the Vultures and Creditor Rights, Discussion Paper No. 5710 (Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, June 2006).  In our view, Miller and Thomas overstate the extent to which larger objectives 
motivated the court’s decisions.  But we agree that the judge was sensitive to the dangers of interfering with 
Argentina’s negotiations with its creditors. 
44  US Judge Limits Scope Of Discovery On Argentine Assets, U.S. DOW JONES CAPITAL MARKETS 
REPORT, May 13, 2004.  
45  See, e.g., Laura Alfaro, Creditor Activism in Sovereign Debt: ‘Vulture’ Tactics or Market Backbone, at 
1 (Harv. Bus. School Case Study No. 9-706-057, Aug. 17, 2006)(noting that the exchange had “a 76% 
participation rate, under the usual rate of above 90% in other restructurings worldwide”). 
46  See, e.g., Adam Thompson, Argentina Seeks to Ease Creditor Concerns on Debt Clause, FIN. TIMES, 
Jan. 15, 2005. 
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strong backing of Argentine public opinion and a strengthening economy, the Kirchner 
government adopted a hard negotiating line and refused to make significant concessions 
on its first offer.  Most of Argentina’s costs of default had been incurred in 2002 and 
were sunk by the time negotiations started and neither the Argentine economy nor the 
government was in urgent need of borrowing from international capital markets.   
 
Despite the tough stance taken by the Argentine government and its decision to move 
forward with a new unilateral, take-it-or-leave-it, debt-swap offer, it still took 
considerable time to put forward a new offer.  There were initial hesitations as to the 
form of the offer and the extent to which early adopters should be favored over later 
adopters to build in an incentive to accept the exchange47. The Argentine government 
also had great difficulty signing up an investment bank to organize the debt-exchange. 
Finally, following a worldwide road-show to advertise the exchange, Argentina still had 
to receive the approval of a number of national financial regulators in countries like Italy, 
with a large number of small bondholders.    
 
The swap succeeded, but not because Argentina responded to the bondholders’ demands. 
Rather, after holding on to a tough bargaining stance for four years, Argentina managed 
to wear down a large fraction of creditors. Many of the original creditors sold their debt 
to speculators who paid far less than face value.  For these buyers, even a 75% haircut 
would mean a significant return on their investment.  Also, Argentina benefited from a 
sharp decline in emerging market debt yields, an unexpected development that has 
produced a substantial increase in the real value of the debt exchange.    
 
Few observers would describe this experience as vindication of the ad hoc approach. It is 
even harder to describe Argentina’s debt restructuring experience of the past four years as 
particularly favorable to creditors. Bondholders could hardly have obtained worse terms 
had the restructuring taken place under a more formal bankruptcy procedure such as that 
proposed by the SDRM. In all likelihood, they would have secured a deal a lot sooner and 
under better terms.   
 
In hindsight, the Argentine experience points to one major advantage of a statutory 
approach: it can be structured to keep the negotiating process moving forward by 
specifying hard deadlines for offers to be submitted, as in Chapter 11, and by structuring 
incentives for the parties to come to a quick resolution of the restructuring process. The 
Argentine experience also highlights that creditors can be put in a weaker bargaining 
position under ad hoc negotiations if the debtor can impose more or less coercive 
                                                 
47  According to Dow Jones Newswire, the Argentine Government eventually decided to abandon initial 
plans to include "exit consent" clauses in Argentina's debt-swap offer as a way of avoiding potential future 
litigation and securing approval of the plan with some countries’ financial regulators.  DOW JONES 
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 5, 2004. 
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exchange offers, than they would be if final approval depended on some form of super-




4. STRUCTURED NEGOTIATION AND SOVEREIGN 
BANKRUPTCY PROPOSALS 
 
In contrast with the emphasis on changing the contractual rights and obligations of 
debtors and creditors, IMF proposed a new initiative in international law, the Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring Mechanism. While it did not win enough political support for 
implementation, it was seriously developed and considered by governments. Other 
proposals for formal bankruptcy-type mechanisms and informal processes of mediation 
as well as arbitration have been made to facilitate debt decision making. Given how 
important it was, we first focus on the SDRM and then discuss a number of the other 
proposals, setting the stage for our own proposal described in the subsequent part of this 
chapter.  
 
4.1. The IMF’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 
 
In late 2001, the IMF stunned the international financial community by calling for a 
sovereign bankruptcy procedure.48  The IMF’s sovereign bankruptcy initiative was first 
announced in a November, 2001 speech by Anne Krueger.  The IMF staff subsequently 
produced a series of detailed draft proposals outlining the SDRM in 2002 and early 2003.  
Because the IMF’s proposal has been the lightening rod for recent debate over sovereign 
bankruptcy, we will explore it in some detail before briefly considering several 
alternatives and then describing the approach we advocate.49 
 
The guiding concern of the IMF’s proposal was to resolve collective action problems 
among dispersed creditors in debt restructuring negotiations, while preserving creditor 
contractual rights as much as possible.50  Viewed from this perspective, the key element 
in the IMF’s proposed mechanism was a majority vote among creditors on a restructuring 
plan, which would bind a dissenting minority.51 With the aim of preserving creditor rights 
                                                 
48   In advocating sovereign bankruptcy, the IMF seems to have taken its cue from a statement made by 
Treasury Secretary O’Neill in congressional testimony (see Brad Setser, and Anna Gelpern and Mitu 
Gulati, this volume). 
49  Much of the description and analysis in this section is drawn from Bolton & Skeel, supra note [7], at 
776-80.  The IMF’s first detailed proposal was INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE DESIGN 
OF THE SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM– FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
(2002)[hereinafter, IMF, DESIGN OF THE SDRM], available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/112702.pdf.  This proposal was subsequently adjusted.  
INT’L MONETARY FUND, PROPOSED FEATURES OF A SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
MECHANISM (2003)[hereinafter, IMF, PROPOSED FEATURES], available at 
http//www.imf.org/external/n/pdr/sdrm/2003/021203.pdf. 
50   IMF, DESIGN OF THE SDRM, supra note 49, at 7 (suggesting that the SDRM provisions should 
resolve “a critical collective action problem” but do so “in a manner that minimizes interference with 
contractual rights and obligations”). 
51   Id. at 10 (calling for voting threshold of 75 percent of registered and verified claims). 
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as much as possible, the IMF’s plan generally did not envisage a stay on litigation and 
individual debt collection efforts or a standstill on debt payments.52  The main stated 
justification for not introducing an automatic stay into an SDRM was that it was 
unnecessary, as sovereign assets are much harder to collect than corporate assets.  
Lengthy and uncertain litigation might be required and even if the plaintiff prevailed it 
was likely that a restructuring agreement would already have been approved in the 
meantime, which could limit the plaintiff’s gain. 
 
The main limitation on plaintiffs’ gains that the IMF envisioned mirrors a legal rule in 
international insolvency law: the Hotchpot rule.  This rule requires that any payment or 
asset collected by a plaintiff through litigation must be offset against the plaintiff’s claim 
in the restructuring agreement.53  That is, any new claim the plaintiff would be entitled to 
in the restructuring agreement would be reduced by an amount equal to what the creditor 
obtained through legal action.  Should the plaintiff obtain more than what the 
restructuring agreement specifies then the Hotchpot rule could be supplemented with a 
claw-back provision.  The IMF’s proposed plan did not allow for such a provision on the 
grounds that it would be impractical.54  
  
The Hotchpot rule clearly reduces incentives for private litigation, but it does not 
eliminate them.  Also, it does not directly address the concern that private litigation may 
be undertaken mainly as a negotiation or delaying tactic, for example by undermining the 
sovereign’s ability to trade. The IMF’s proposed plan recognized this issue and proposed 
that the judge (see below) could have authority to stay specific legal actions on request of 
the debtor and subject to approval of creditors.  
  
The voting provision and the Hotchpot rule were the centerpieces of the IMF’s proposed 
plan.  The plan also contained many more technical provisions dealing with notification 
of creditors, registration and verification of claims.55  As in corporate bankruptcy this can 
be a lengthy and difficult process.  An important additional complication is that the 
ultimate ownership of a sovereign bond is hard to trace. The court must be able to pierce 
through the veil of beneficial ownership to be able to ascertain whether the votes on a 
particular bond are controlled by the sovereign.  Should that be the case then these votes 
                                                 
52   Id. at 9-10 (concluding that there should be “no generalized stay on enforcement” but leaving open the 
possibility of a creditor vote to impose a stay on a specified action).  The IMF’s subsequent proposals 
contemplated a stay in some, limited circumstances.  See, e.g., IMF, SDRM FEATURES, supra note 49, at 
11-12 (stay if bond creditors committee and SDRM decision maker approve). 
53   IMF, DESIGN OF THE SDRM, supra note 49, at 35-37 (explaining and adopting the Hotchpot Rule 
used for corporate debtors in some jurisdictions). 
54   Id. at 37. 
55   See, e.g., id. at 8-9 (summarizing provisions for determining “eligible claims”). 
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should be ineligible for obvious conflict of interest reasons.56  A related difficulty is that 
for widely dispersed debt structures many claims may not be registered in time.  Given 
the large number of claims that won’t qualify, a requirement that a supermajority of 
“registered” claims approve the plan may function more like a simple majority 
requirement in practice, thus resulting in a weaker protection of creditors. These 
difficulties underscore the need for a court supervised restructuring procedure as well as 
the important benefits that might be available with the establishment of an international 
clearing house. 
  
As the main focus of the IMF’s proposed plan was on the resolution of collective action 
problems among sovereign bondholders, the mechanism was under-inclusive and 
incomplete on the two other major facets of a restructuring procedure, the provision of 
priority financing and the enforcement of absolute priority.  The plan’s only means of 
enforcing absolute priority was through the exclusion of several classes of debt from the 
SDRM.  Thus, the plan proposed to exclude privileged claims, obligations to 
international organizations such as the IMF (“multilaterals”), and debt owed to other 
nations (the “Paris Club”).  A first difficulty with this approach was that it implicitly 
accorded a higher priority to Paris club debt as a fait accompli and singled out by default 
private investors as the main target for debt reduction.  This difficulty was compounded 
by the discretion given to the debtor under the plan to include or exclude debt claims – 
such as trade credit, claims on the central bank, etc – from the SDRM.57  Again, this 
discretion gave the debtor considerable power to undermine a given priority structure and 
to cut side deals with particular creditor classes in exchange for exclusion of their claims 
from the formal SDRM proceedings.   
  
The plan recognized some of these difficulties and proposed as an alternative to include 
Paris club debt in the SDRM under a separate class.58  The plan also allows for other 
forms of classification and gives the debtor discretion to classify under the general 
requirement that classification does not result in “unjustified discrimination of creditor 
groups.”59 While classification brings about greater flexibility it is important to 
understand that it does not guarantee in any way enforcement of absolute priority. To the 
                                                 
56   The problem of sovereign control of key claims, and through these claims, of a vote by creditors, 
figured prominently in a sovereign debt dispute involving Brazil in the 1990s.  Through Banco do Brasil, 
which had participated in a syndicated loan agreement, Brazil managed to thwart an effort by other holders 
of the debt to accelerate the amounts due under the loan.  CIBC Bank and Trust Company v. Banco Central 
do Brasil, 886 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)(refusing to intervene to impose implied obligations of good 
faith and fair dealing).  For discussion and criticism, see Bratton & Gulati, supra note 24.   
57   IMF, DESIGN OF THE SDRM, supra note 49, at 13 (“a debtor may decide to exclude certain types of 
claims from a restructuring, particularly where such exclusion is needed to limit the extent of economic and 
financial dislocation”). 
58   Id. at 24-25.  Because the Paris Club resisted any inclusion in the SDRM, the IMF ultimately left open 
the possibility that the Paris Club would be excluded altogether. 
59   Id. at 53. 
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contrary, the IMF’s plan might well have facilitated deviations from absolute priority by 
giving a veto power, unconstrained by a cramdown or best interest rule,  to a junior 
creditor class.  
  
Just as the IMF’s plan does not systematically address the issue of enforcing absolute 
priority it also only gives lip service to the issue of debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing.  
Again, with the objective of preserving creditor contractual rights as much as possible, 
the IMF’s proposed plan only allowed for “priority financing” if it was approved by “75 
percent of outstanding principal of registered claims.”60  The main purpose of DIP 
financing is to address an immediate cash crisis and allow the debtor to function while 
the restructuring negotiations are ongoing. Clearly, a creditor vote would be extremely 
difficult to organize in a timely fashion, making it virtually impossible to organize any 
such financing.  
  
The last key component of the IMF’s plan was its proposal to set up an independent 
Sovereign Debt Dispute Resolution Forum (SDDRF) to oversee the sovereign bankruptcy 
process.61  The selection of judges to be appointed to the SDDRF would be delegated to a 
selection panel designated by the IMF’s Managing Director and charged with the task of 
making up a shortlist of candidate judges that might be impaneled when a debt crisis 
arises. The final shortlist would be subject to approval of the IMF’s governing board.  
The president of the SDDRF would be charged with the selection of the final group of 
four judges to be impaneled in the event of a crisis.  While the plan goes to considerable 
lengths to guarantee the independence of the SDDRF, and to limit the SDDRF’s role, it is 
still worth noting that this procedure was not a foolproof method to guarantee the full 
independence of the court. 
  
Overall, the IMF plan was an extremely important development in our thinking about 
how best to address sovereign debt crises.  As this brief overview makes clear, however, 
it also had serious limitations.  Most importantly, the IMF plan focused extensively on 
the ex post issue of solving creditors’ collective action problems, but it paid much less 
attention to the equally important issue of the ex ante effects of an SDRM – in particular, 
the need to honor creditors’ repayment priorities in order to facilitate sovereign credit 
markets.  In addition, the IMF’s proposal for interim financing was cumbersome and did 
not fully address the growing concerns about the nature of the IMF’s funding and 
oversight role.  Finally, the creation of an SDDRF by the IMF itself raised independence 
and conflict of interest concerns. 
 
 
                                                 
60   Id. at 10. 
61   The parameters of the SDDRF are outlined in id. at 56-70. 
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4.2. Other Sovereign Bankruptcy Proposals 
 
Although the IMF’s sovereign bankruptcy proposal received a great deal of attention, it 
was far from the first effort to introduce bankruptcy principles into sovereign finance.  
Starting with Christopher Oeschsli in the early 1980s, a series of commentators have 
developed proposals for a sovereign bankruptcy scheme.62  This section briefly considers 
four representative examples: a proposal by Jeff Sachs in 1995, followed by the schemes 
defended by Steven Schwarcz, the Jubilee movement, and Lerrick and Meltzer after the 
turn of the new century.  Although the proposals differ in major respects, they share 
similar limitations.63 
 
A much discussed speech by Jeff Sachs did more than any other proposal to introduce the 
concept of sovereign bankruptcy into sovereign finance circles.64  Writing in the 
immediate aftermath of the Mexican liquidity crisis, Sachs called for a sovereign 
bankruptcy regime that would include a standstill on creditors’ collection efforts and 
provision for interim financing based on the special priority provided in U.S. Chapter 11 
for financing corporate reorganizations.  Sachs’ proposal was not designed to offer a fully 
developed sovereign bankruptcy regime.  An important limitation of the proposal, 
particularly as viewed through the lens of subsequent developments, is that it did not 
provide any criteria for when interim financing should be allowed and how the amounts 
might be limited.  As we have seen, these are increasingly critical issues given the 
constraints on the IMF’s funding.  The proposal also did not provide any mechanism for 
inducing the parties to reach agreement in the event their negotiations broke down – no 
proxy for the role that the threat of liquidation and cramdown play in Chapter 11. 
  
Five years after Sachs, Steven Schwarcz outlined a more elaborate sovereign bankruptcy 
regime.65  Like Sachs, Schwarcz advocated priority for interim financing, but he differed 
from Sachs in his view that it was unnecessary to impose a standstill in the sovereign 
context.66  Schwarcz concluded that only the sovereign debtor should be permitted to 
initiate the proceeding, and he explicitly rejected the use of a cramdown procedure.   For 
present purposes, the most important flaws in Schwarcz’s proposal, as with Sachs’, were 
                                                 
62   Christopher Oeschsli, Procedural Guidelines for Renegotiating LDC Debts: An Analogy to Chapter 11 
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Reform Act, 21 VA. J. INT’L L. 305 (1981). 
63   Nearly all of the sovereign bankruptcy proposals made as of 2001 are surveyed in Kenneth Rogoff & 
Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of  Ideas, 1976-2001, 49 IMF 
STAFF PAPERS 470 (2002). 
64   Jeffrey Sachs, Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort? (Frank D. Graham Lecture, 
Princeton University, April 20, 1995). 
65   Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 101 (2000). 
66   We share Sach’s view that sovereign bankruptcy should include at least a limited stay.  Bolton & Skeel, 
supra note 7, at 780-86 (suggesting that enforcement of judgments should be stayed, though litigation up to 
this point could go forward). 
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the absence of any principle for defining when interim financing should be permitted and 
the absence of a mechanism to induce agreement. 
  
A third proposal, introduced by Adam Lerrick and Allan Meltzer, was based on the view 
that sovereign debt crises very frequently are caused by runs on the sovereign’s currency 
and securities.67  Like Sachs’, their proposal emphasized the need for a standstill and for 
fresh interim financing during the debt crisis.  In Lerrick and Meltzer’s proposed regime, 
the IMF would provide new funding in unlimited amounts in order to stabilize the price 
of the sovereign’s debt in secondary markets.  Even if Lerrick-Meltzer were correct to 
focus on liquidity concerns, their proposal founders on its assumption that the IMF has 
the capacity to provide unlimited funding in the event of a sovereign debt crisis. 
  
The final sovereign bankruptcy proposal came from a very different source.  Since the 
late 1990s, the Jubilee movement, which was inspired by religious leaders and churches, 
has campaigned for debt relief and aid to developing countries.  To resolve sovereign 
debt crises, Jubilee called for a “fair and transparent arbitration process” that was 
explicitly based on Chapter 9 of the U.S. bankruptcy laws, the chapter that covers 
municipal bankruptcy.68  The five key elements of the Jubilee proposal are: a neutral 
decision making body; a comprehensive procedure that includes all claims; the right of 
all stakeholders to be heard; an emphasis on protecting the social needs of the sovereign’s 
citizens, and imposition of a standstill.  While the Jubilee proposal introduced important 
considerations that are often neglected in sovereign debt discourse, it had many of the 
same limitations as the other proposals.  Once again, there was no stick – no effective 
proxy for cramdown – to put pressure on the parties to reach agreement.69  The Jubilee 
proposal also did not address the appropriate role and limitations of the IMF nor the need 
for consistent, enforceable priorities in sovereign debt markets. 
 
4.3. Mediation Approaches 
 
A related strategy that has generated interest in some circles is reliance on structured 
                                                 
67  Adam Lerrick & Allan H. Meltzer, Blueprint for an International Lender of Last Resort (unpublished 
manuscript, 2001). 
68   See, e.g., Erlassjahr.de, A Fair and Transparent Arbitration Process for Indebted Southern Countries, 
available at http//www.erlassjahr.edu (German Jubilee proposal).  The Jubilee’s FTAP is drawn from the 
work of Austrian economist Kunibert Raffer. 
69   Interestingly, Chapter 9, which is an important inspiration for the Jubilee proposal, does include 
cramdown provisions.  11 U.S.C. sec. 901 (incorporating parts of 11 U.S.C. sec. 1129(b)).   In the Chapter 
9 context, cramdown is generally seen as requiring that the plan be fair, equitable, and flexible.  What is not 
clear is whether a municipality must raise new tax revenues to satisfy this standard.  The Chapter 9 
approach would require too much judicial discretion to function effectively in the sovereign context; 
perhaps this is one reason why Jubilee did not include cramdown as one of their five key provisions.  In the 
next subsection, we outline a two-step voting procedure that would function like cramdown without 
requiring nearly as much judicial oversight.  See Part III(B)(5), infra. 
27 
 
mediation.70  Perhaps the most fully developed of these proposals was Richard Gitlin’s 
call for a dispute resolution forum that would include a registry of creditors’ claims.71  
Under Gitlin’s approach, the creditors whose claims were recognized would participate in 
a global mediation process designed to reach agreement on the terms of a restructuring.  
A recent proposal by Joe Stiglitz takes this approach approach a step further.  In Stiglitz’s 
regime, which he refers to as an intermediate or “soft law’ approach, a mediator would 
oversee the sovereign debtor’s negotiations with its creditors and issue a report evaluating 
the sovereign’s proposed restructuring plan.72 
 
The principal virtues of mediation inhere in its intermediate status: as with CAC’s, 
mediation could theoretically be implemented without amending the IMF’s articles or 
relying on treaties to put the framework in place; and like a full-blown sovereign 
bankruptcy regime, it would take all of the sovereign’s creditors into account, rather than 
just individual bondholders.  Mediation also has several serious limitations, however.  
Like CAC’s, the existing mediation proposals do not address the need for an enforceable 
priority framework.   In theory, this deficiency could be solved by including a priority 
scheme in the mediation framework, although the resulting regime would look more like 
sovereign bankruptcy than mediation.   The other shortcoming of mediation is that it does 
not provide any “stick” to induce the sovereign and its creditors to reach agreement.  The 
sovereign debt mediator would not have the authority to impose the terms of an 
agreement on the parties, nor is there any other mechanism to push the parties toward a 
resolution.  As a result, the process would simply break down if there were an impasse 
between the sovereign and one or more of its constituencies. 
 
                                                 
70   The mediation approaches are somewhat similar to the arbitration strategies proposed by Jubilee and 
several commentators.  The Jubilee proposal is discussed in Part III(B), supra. 
71   See, e.g., Richard A. Gitlin, A Proposal: Sovereign Debt Forum (Presentation at the U.N. Financing for 
Development Conference, Monterrey, Mexico, March 19, 2002). 




5.  RETHINKING SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY AND THE ROLE 
OF THE IMF 
  
The chief benefits of the existing sovereign bankruptcy proposals are their effectiveness 
in solving the problem of creditor coordination and their provision for a single, 
comprehensive forum for resolving a sovereign debt crisis.  But the existing proposals 
either ignore or do not satisfactorily address pressing issues such as the absence of a 
coherent priority scheme, the need for an interim financing strategy that refines and alters 
the role of the IMF, and the need for an independent decision maker to oversee the 
sovereign bankruptcy framework.  In earlier work, we have explained how an expanded 
sovereign bankruptcy framework might handle each of these issues.73 
  
5.1. The “Bolton-Skeel” Proposal 
 
With respect to priority, the sovereign bankruptcy framework should include a straight 
first in time priority framework, together with voting procedures that call for absolute 
priority treatment – that is, the assurance that higher priority creditors will be paid in full, 
and that any haircut will be aimed first at lower priority creditors.  Under the Bolton-
Skeel proposal, priority would be based on the time that the credit was extended, with the 
debt of any given year taking priority over debt issued in a subsequent year.  Based on 
this priority, the sovereign debtor would divide its creditors into classes at the outset of a 
two tier voting process for restructuring the sovereign’s debt.  For the purposes of the 
first vote, the debtor would make a proposal as to how much of its overall debt would be 
discharged– that is, how large the overall haircut to creditors would be.74 
 
If a majority of all creditors approved the haircut, the debtor would submit a restructuring 
plan to the creditors outlining the proposed treatment of each class of creditors for a 
second, class-by-class vote.75  If the requisite majority of each class voted yes, the plan 
                                                 
73   Bolton & Skeel, supra note 7. 
74  At first glance, it may appear that the first step vote would invariably lead to a 49% haircut under a 
simple majority voting rule, since a bare majority of creditors would form a coalition to cut off the 
remaining creditors, thus increasing the likelihood of repayment for the winning creditors.  But the 
minimum winning coalition intuition only applies if there are numerous, same-sized classes of creditors.  If 
there were only one large creditor, for instance, the creditor would presumably agree to whatever haircut 
optimizes its repayment, based on the sovereign debtor’s financial condition.  In the real world, the capital 
structure of a sovereign debtor will fall somewhere between the two extremes of numerous, same-sized 
classes and a single giant creditor.  The first stage vote will also be affected by other factors. For example, 
sovereign debtors might seek only as much of a haircut as is necessary, in order to preserve its access to 
sovereign debt markets after the bankruptcy. 
75   The proposal is developed in much more detail in Bolton & Skeel, supra note 7.  Our proposal does not 
specify the required voting percentage, as the voting rule could be tailored by each sovereign when the 
bankruptcy framework was adopted.  But we speculate that many would require a two-thirds supermajority, 
as under U.S. Chapter 11.  Bolton & Skeel, supra note 7, at 797. 
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would be implemented according to its terms.    In the event that one or more classes 
rejected the plan, on the other hand, the court would reduce the creditors’ claims in the 
amount of the agreed upon haircut, starting with the lowest priority creditors and working 
up the priority hierarchy.   
 
This two step approach has several crucial virtues.  Perhaps most importantly, it would 
clarify creditors’ priorities outside of bankruptcy and sharply reduce the risk of debt 
dilution.  The first in time priority scheme would apply outside of, as well as in, 
sovereign bankruptcy, because creditors would know that any subsequent bankruptcy 
would be governed by the first-in-time priority scheme.76  For sovereigns that actually 
invoked the procedure, the two step voting structure would provide a mechanism for 
pushing the parties towards a resolution even if bargaining breaks down, much as the 
threat of liquidation and or cramdown do in ordinary corporate bankruptcies under U.S. 
Chapter 11.77 
  
The principal exception to absolute priority in our sovereign bankruptcy framework 
comes with its second key feature, interim financing.  As with corporate debtors in 
Chapter 11, our framework would provide first priority for interim financing in order to 
counteract the debt overhang problem that otherwise might discourage lenders from 
financing the restructuring process.  Because of the risk that priority treatment would 
encourage overborrowing, however, we distinguish between two categories of loans.  
Loans to finance the sovereign’s trade debt would be presumptively permissible,78 
whereas larger loans would be permitted only if a majority of the sovereign’s creditors 
agreed to the financing.  This strategy would effectively cabin the size of interim loans.  
In addition to minimizing the risk of overborrowing, it also would reduce the impact on 
the IMF’s budget if it continued to serve as interim financer.79 
 
Two leading scholars, Nouriel Roubini and Brad Setser, have recently critiqued the first-
                                                 
76   Sovereigns could still try to game the system and to dilute earlier debt by issuing debt with very short 
maturities as their finances deteriorated, of course.  They would have difficulty finding buyers for such 
debt, however, because investors would know that their interests would be wiped out if the sovereign 
debtor nevertheless filed for bankruptcy. This could help short-circuit the final and pointless surge in debt 
before the creditors deny any new credit and the debtor defaults. 
77   Under Bankruptcy Code sec. 1112(b), creditors can propose that the case be converted to Chapter 7 in 
order to liquidate the debtor; and sec. 1129(b) provides a mechanism for “cramming” down a 
reorganization plan despite the objection of one or more classes of creditors.  Although sovereign debtors 
cannot be liquidated and the absence of a liquidation option makes cramdown difficult, the two-tiered 
voting regime is designed to achieve a similar effect. 
78  For a description of the contours of trade debt financing, see, e.g., IMF, Trade Finance in Financial 
Crises: Assessment of Key Issues (Dec. 9, 2003). 
79   Our earlier article contemplated that the IMF would continue to play this role.  In the following section 




in-time priority scheme of the Bolton-Skeel proposal.80  They argue that the proposal 
would complicate the construction of a sovereign yield curve, since “a new five-year 
bond would be worth less (because of its lower position in the pecking order) than a ten-
year bond that was issued five years ago.”81  They argue that junior creditors would insist 
on short maturity in order to evade the effects of their low, later in time priority; that the 
rule would require exceptions, such as special priority for interim financing; that it would 
require supplemental rules to prevent evasion; and that it would give rulers of a sovereign 
that has little debt an incentive to go on a borrowing “binge,” presumably to take 
advantage of the cheaper financing made possible by priority for early creditors.82  On 
inspection, none of the objections is worrisome.  First, as Roubini and Setser 
acknowledge, “the markets could adjust” to the valuation effects of a shift to a 
meaningful priority scheme.83  Second, as far as use of short maturities to evade the 
effects of the priority scheme, this danger is far greater in the current regime, which lacks 
either enforceable priorities or a sovereign bankruptcy framework.  Third, we have 
already discussed the importance of providing an exception to the first-in-time scheme 
for interim financing.  Once again, a first-in-time scheme with one key exception – a 
combination that has long been central to US domestic bankruptcy law – would greatly 
improve on existing sovereign finance.  Similarly, while supplemental rules might be 
useful to protect the integrity of the priority scheme, the scheme would improve 
sovereign finance even without additional adjustment.  Finally, we doubt that the 
proposal would increase borrowing binges by low debt sovereigns (low debt sovereigns 
can binge even absent first-in-time priority), and the proposal would significantly reduce 
the ability of high debt sovereigns to postpone default by taking on more debt.   
 
The final issue is who should oversee the sovereign bankruptcy framework.  Unlike 
earlier proposals, which would vest authority in a panel of experts set up by a new or 
existing international organization, our proposal would permit sovereign debtors to file 
their case in the bankruptcy or insolvency court of any jurisdiction where the sovereign 
has issued bonds.  (Currently, this is likely to mean New York, London, Frankfurt or 
Tokyo).  Not only would judges make better decision makers than the experts selected by 
a bureaucratic process, but giving sovereigns a choice would promote jurisdictional 
competition and, as a result, further enhance the decision making process.  The 
competition would be loosely analogous to the benefits of venue choice for corporate 




                                                 
80   ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 2, at 280-82. 
81   Id. at 280. 
82   Id. at 280-81. 
83   Id. at 281. 
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5.2. Transforming the IMF’s Role  
 
The IMF’s place in the international financial architecture is now more uncertain than it 
has been since the collapse of the Bretton-Woods framework in the 1970s and possibly 
even since the IMF’s inception in 1944. No developed economy country has sought Fund 
assistance in over a quarter of a century. Moreover, since the recovery from the spate of 
financial crises in the late 1990s, the size of the Fund relative to international financial 
markets and to the stock of foreign reserves held by central banks around the world has 
been shrinking to the point where it can no longer envision playing a credible role as 
lender of last resort for emerging economies.  Instead, the Fund has been redefining its 
mission as international leadership on macroeconomic policy assistance for developing 
and transition economies, with an increasing focus on the poorest countries. It is not clear 
that the Fund always has the ability to fill this new role effectively and there is a risk that 
it may end up being marginalized.  
     
One obvious way of restoring the Fund’s original role, advocated by some countries in 
the Group of 7, is to substantially increase the size of the Fund.  But even if this 
enlargement were feasible, the history of past interventions would still raise major 
concerns about the potential distortions large bailout packages can introduce into 
sovereign debt markets. Another way forward, advocated by several leading economists, 
is to move in the opposite direction, further scaling back the size of the fund, phasing out 
IMF programs entirely, and confining the IMF to a purely advisory role.84 
  
We believe that neither of these two options is desirable. If the IMF were no longer a 
major source of emergency lending for distressed sovereigns, as advocates of a scaled 
back IMF propose, why should sovereign governments pay any attention to its advice?  
Even advice offered for free would not be welcome and the IMF would be doomed to 
irrelevance. More importantly, once the IMF exited the lending business it could no 
longer play its role as catalyst to help resolve liquidity crises and debt panics.85 The 
alternative solution, a much larger but unreformed and highly political institution, would 
give rise to moral hazard in lending and other distortions. Perpetuating the status quo is 
equally undesirable, since it would be equivalent to condemning the institution to a slow 
death.       
 
Rather than any of these alternatives, we believe that the IMF’s role should be 
reconfigured in a very different way, as part of a sovereign bankruptcy framework that 
establishes an enforceable priority system for sovereign debt.  The role we envision 
                                                 
84  See Rogoff, supra note 3; Chari & Kehoe, supra note 3. 
85  See Corsetti, Guimaraes & Roubini, The Tradeoff Between an International Lender of Last Resort to 
Deal with Liquidity Crisis and Moral Hazard Distortions: A Model of the IMF’s Catalytic Finance 
Approach  (Discussion Paper, Yale University 2003). 
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would strengthen the IMF’s ability to act as an ILOLR in emerging market liquidity and 
confidence crises.  It also would strengthen the IMF’s hand in resolving sovereign debt 
insolvency crises. Yet it would not require any new public funding.   
 
The proposal is quite simple.  Instead of acting like a central bank that provides liquidity 
to a bank facing a bank run, the IMF would function like a bankruptcy court charged with 
granting first-day orders and other DIP financing.  In practice, not much change would be 
required in the way the IMF operates. A distressed sovereign would still begin by 
approaching the Fund with a request for an assistance package. The size of the loan and 
its conditionality would still be negotiated between the Fund and the Sovereign behind 
closed doors, albeit with potential providers of DIP financing able to make an input (see 
below). The loan agreement would still have to be approved by the IMF’s Board.  But 
under the new role we envision, the IMF would put together a funding package that 
would include priority lending from the private sector along with its own funds and any 
other public funding it can assemble. Over time, the IMF would need to rely on a greater 
and greater contribution from the private sector.86  
 
To secure this sovereign debt version of DIP financing, the negotiations would therefore 
involve the private sector as well as the IMF, since few private lenders are anxious to 
lend on a sight-unseen basis.  In practice, the private sector involvement would be an 
important benefit of the new model we envision. Currently, when a package is put 
together the private sector does not participate in the negotiations and essentially must 
take the deal the IMF has worked out with the sovereign as a fait accompli. This process 
not only makes it more difficult to involve the private sector, but also encourages free 
riding by private lenders on the IMF’s emergency lending. Under our proposed new 
system, private lenders would be directly involved in the negotiations; private sector 
involvement would thus automatically be tied to the rescue deal.  The coordination 
between private lenders and the IMF’s role as ILOLR is an important benefit of our 
proposed system.    
 
Another important benefit of the new model is that it would gradually shift from taxpayer 
to private sector money and would be subject to more and more market discipline.  If the 
private sector viewed a proposed rescue package as just more money down the drain it 
would in all likelihood refuse to extend new lending even if the new loans had higher 
priority status.87  Similarly, if the sovereign were a repeat offender it would over time 
                                                 
86   Our proposal thus differs sharply from Schwarcz’s suggestion that the IMF should borrow from the 
capital markets to fund a sovereign’s interim financing needs.  Schwarcz, supra note 65, at 986-93. 
87   This intuition is buttressed by the experience in U.S. Chapter 11 cases.  The existing empirical evidence 
suggests that DIP financers are more likely to lend to debtors that have a significant chance of successfully 
reorganizing, than to more precarious firms.  See, e.g., Maria Carapeto, Does Debtor-in-Possession 
Financing Add Value? (unpublished manuscript, 2003)(debtors that received interim financing more likely 
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have less and less access to emergency lending and would risk being shut out of the 
international credit markets.88 The reason is simply that following each crisis the 
sovereign would have accumulated a larger stock of still outstanding priority debt and 
would be less and less able to secure new DIP financing, particularly if, as we propose 
below, prior DIP loans have priority over any subsequent DIP financing.89 
 
While the new role we envision calls for a radical departure from existing policy, it 
would not fundamentally change the process by which the larger crises are currently 
handled.  Consider, for example, how the IMF managed South Korea’s debt crisis in 
1997. After a substantial rescue package was put together on December 3, 1997, it 
quickly became clear that the funds promised to the South Korean Government would be 
insufficient.90  The package had not adequately reassured markets, and banks continued 
to pull out of Korean sovereign debt, refusing to roll over their short-term loans, 
something they had never objected to doing in the past. Faced with an impending crisis, 
the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve resolved as a last resort to convene a meeting with 
the major lenders under the auspices of the New York Fed on December 22, 1997, and 
managed to wring an informal agreement from those present to continue rolling over their 
loans.91  The only way the Treasury and Fed could entice the banks to show up at the 
meeting, and then to cooperate by agreeing to roll over their loans, was moral suasion 
bolstered by the fear of a major financial crisis should banks refuse to follow the IMF’s 
lead.  As several commentators have observed, moral suasion is a rather weak 
inducement to rely on to deal with a crisis of such proportions, and it would be foolish to 
depend on such a policy to maintain international financial stability.  It is not difficult to 
imagine a different outcome to the Korean crisis, with some major banks deciding not to 
attend the meeting at the New York Fed for example, and others unwilling to go along 
with the IMF or unable to agree on how the cost of rolling over their debts should be 
shared.    
 
Now imagine the same situation, but with the IMF wielding new powers to grant priority 
                                                                                                                                                 
to reorganize); Sandeep Dahiya et al, Debtor-in-Possession Financing and Bankruptcy Resolution: 
Empirical Evidence, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 259 (2003)(same). 
88  Our approach would not preclude debt reduction initiatives for Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). 
These initiatives would just take a different form. Instead of forgiving previously granted official 
multilateral debt, the international community would buy previously issued private DIP debt in the 
secondary market and then retire it.  
89  See text following note 96, infra. 
90 A total of $55 billion, of which a portion of $21 billion was contributed by the IMF, was promised the 
South Korean Government. This represented the highest amount the IMF had ever lent to a single country 
and exceeded by a multiple of six the normal quota See BLUSTEIN, supra note 2.    
91  Six U.S. banks – Citibank, J.P. Morgan, Chase, Bank of America, Bankers Trust and Bank of New York 
– attended the first New York meeting, which kick-started a series of negotiations with international banks 
that eventually led to a rescheduling agreement of $22 billion in short-term loans in exchange for a 
sovereign bond with the Korean government on January 28, 1998.  Id. at 177-205.     
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status to banks’ new emergency lending. In contrast to the situation at the time, under this 
new regime banks would have had an incentive to attend the meeting, since this might 
have given them an opportunity to obtain higher priority status for their new loans, 
which, one should keep in mind, mainly rolled over maturing old loans. The higher 
priority would have put them in a stronger position than the banks that did not attend the 
meeting if the rescue plan failed and Korea defaulted on its existing debts.  In addition, 
for those banks attending the meeting, the IMF would have been able to secure their 
cooperation much more easily by granting seniority status to their new loans.92 
  
While the potentially huge benefits of this new role for the IMF are obvious, there also 
are several potential concerns. A first issue is whether a highly politicized institution like 
today’s IMF would abuse its new powers and grant priority lending too liberally. This 
was a constant worry in the early days of Chapter 11, with courts permitting debtors to 
drag out cases for years, and generally deviating too easily from enforcement of absolute 
priority.93   The history of IMF bailouts suggests that similar problems could undermine 
the framework we have described unless the ability to grant priority status to emergency 
lending were constrained in important respects. One such protection might be to require 
joint creditor approval of the DIP loans, if the loans are beyond a certain size or involve a 
high proportion of new lenders.94  
 
There is a delicate balancing here, however, as any approval required by creditors before 
the DIP financing is granted could undermine the IMF’s ability to respond quickly and 
quietly to a crisis. Announcing to all creditors that a sovereign is seeking their approval 
for new DIP financing is tantamount to broadcasting the sovereign’s financial distress to 
the world and may well do more harm than good.    Therefore, unless the sovereign were 
already in default and had suspended debt payments, and short of reforming the 
governance of the IMF, a more practical protection would be to either put ex ante limits 
on the size of DIP financing (such as a maximum percentage of outstanding debt) or to 
allow for the possibility that courts could reverse the priority status of the most egregious 
forms of DIP financing ex post if the sovereign subsequently invoked the bankruptcy 
procedures once again. This latter possibility would instill some market discipline on the 
DIP lenders and limit the worst forms of abuse of DIP financing, although at the cost of 
                                                 
92   Although the size of the bank loans would often be quite large, there is no reason to suspect that this 
would jeopardize the financing process we propose.  In ordinary corporate bankruptcy cases, bankruptcy 
courts have overseen major loans—such as the $1.5 billion DIP loan to United Airlines—without a hitch. 
93  See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 WISC. L. REV. (documenting the 
increased length of Chapter 11 cases). 
94    The possibility of a creditor vote on financing in the corporate context is considered and critiqued in 
George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV. 
901, 915-16 (1994).  Our previous article proposed that financing in amounts sufficient to cover a 
sovereign’s trade debt should presumptively be approved, without a creditor vote.  Bolton & Skeel, supra 
note 7, at 808. 
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introducing additional uncertainty into the lending markets.95    
 
A second concern is whether a priority rule for sovereign debt could be enforced at all. 
How would the IMF be able to enforce priority?   How should a recalcitrant sovereign be 
dealt with?  So far the IMF has on the whole been able to enforce the higher priority of its 
own funds.96  The IMF’s success can be traced to a major carrot and stick the IMF can 
apply to enforce its priority status.  Compliant sovereigns continue to have access to IMF 
programs at favorable rates, whereas a recalcitrant sovereign risks losing its membership 
and facing some form of exclusion from sovereign debt markets. There is no reason a 
priori to expect that the IMF’s enforcement powers would disappear if the loan were 
made by the private sector with the IMF’s blessing. But, should the stock of senior debt 
become so large that the sovereign might be tempted to default and to ignore the priority 
status in a restructuring, one could still envision enforcement of priority through the 
courts via Elliott-style remedies.  
 
Third, what happens when a sovereign repeatedly runs into financial distress and 
accumulates senior loans from past DIP financing?   Wouldn’t new DIP financing risk 
diluting old DIP loans, if the sovereign debtor defaulted a second or even third time on all 
its debt?  And if this dilution were anticipated wouldn’t it prevent the IMF from raising 
emergency lending from the private sector?  An obvious way of addressing these 
problems would be to make sure that past DIP loans had priority over current and future 
DIP loans.   In effect, the first priority DIP loans would themselves be subject to a first-
in-time priority regime. 
 
Fourth, how would Paris Club debt and other bilateral government debt be treated?    
Ideally, Paris Club creditors would be subject to the same restructuring process as other 
creditors.  It is highly unlikely, however, that sovereign lenders would agree to put 
themselves under the authority of the IMF or a sovereign bankruptcy regime.  The most 
plausible approach for handling Paris Club debt would be to treat it as a priority 
obligation.  Although this poses the risk that Paris Club loans will dilute the interests of 
private creditors, one benefit is the possibility that an alternative source of emergency 
lending to sovereigns would be available that could serve the role of a safety valve in 
cases where the IMF fails to intervene, perhaps for political reasons.   
 
The final issue is implementation: what changes would need to be made to restructure the 
IMF’s role as we have described?  Advocates of a sovereign bankruptcy regime have 
proposed a variety of implementation strategies.  One commentator suggests that 
                                                 
95   Under U.S. bankruptcy law, a court’s initial decision on DIP financing generally cannot be reversed so 
long as the credit was extended in good faith, a protection that is justified as necessary to assure certainty.  
See 11 U.S.C. sec. 364(e). 
96  See Zettelmeyer, supra note 32. 
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sovereigns could unilaterally adopt a sovereign bankruptcy regime.97  Under this 
approach, a model law could be drafted by UNCITRAL or another international 
organization, and the legislatures of sovereign debtor states could pass legislation based 
on the draft law.  In effect, the bankruptcy framework would set the parameters of the 
debtor’s obligations to its creditors.  A second strategy would rely on treaties among the 
creditor and debtor nations or a convention ratified by the legislatures of the various 
affected countries.98  Still another strategy centers on an amendment of the IMF’s 
articles, which would require majority approval by the IMF and approval of three-fifths 
of the Fund’s members.99  Members would then be expected to take appropriate steps to 
implement the change under their domestic law.  This third approach is the strategy the 
IMF planned to use to implement its SDRM.100 
 
We believe that the new role we envision for the IMF would not by itself require any of 
these changes.  Since our proposal would simply reconfigure the IMF’s existing role – 
retaining IMF oversight while privatizing the lending function – it should not require the 
IMF to go back to its members to ask for different or additional authority.  This suggests 
that the IMF could adopt the reconfigured role on an ad hoc basis, by negotiating a 
financing package that relies on private lending the next time it intervenes in a sovereign 
debt crisis.  In our view, the ease with which the proposal could be adopted is one of its 
signal attractions.   
 
Adjusting the IMF’s role is, by itself, an incomplete solution to the shortcomings in the 
existing international financial architecture; most importantly, it would not address the 
need for a coherent, enforceable priority scheme—a need that we have stressed 
throughout the chapter.  But even in the absence of a more complete reform such as 
sovereign bankruptcy, the reconfigured IMF role offers two hugely important benefits: it 
would address the IMF’s funding limitations and would bring the private sector into the 
heart of the debt restructuring process.  More generally, the reconfigured role would 
preserve the IMF’s relevance for the sovereign debt markets of the new century.  These 
benefits suggest that it would make sense to adopt the new approach now, without 
waiting for more sweeping reforms such as implementation of a sovereign bankruptcy 
regime. 
                                                 
97   Christoph G. Paulus, A Legal Order for Insolvencies of States (unpublished manuscript), 6-7, available 
at http://www.dse.de/ef/sdrm/paulus.htm. 
98   See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 65, at 1011-1017 (describing a hypothetical international convention). 
99   More precisely, amendment of the IMF Articles requires three steps: 1) the Executive Board votes on a 
proposed amendment, and it is approved by a majority of those who vote; 2) the amendment is approved by 
a majority of the Board of Governors who vote; and 3) it is approved by three-fifths of the members of the 
Fund, with at least eighty-five percent of the total voting authority.  See, e.g., IMF, DESIGN OF THE 
SDRM, supra note 49, at 71-72 (describing the amendment process). 









The necessary shift in orientation of IMF policies on crisis resolution and prevention 
towards greater private sector involvement called for in the 1996 Rey Report led almost 
inevitably to the debate on the SDRM, and on the way in which the private sector should 
be involved, a few years later.  Unfortunately, however, this debate quickly turned into a 
somewhat narrow discussion on the merits of collective action clauses.  The broader 
implications of this shift in policy for the IMF’s new role in sovereign debt crises have 
been lost.   The decision by the IMFC at its meetings in April 2003 to shelve the IMF’s 
proposed SDRM has left the future of IMF policy and the form of private sector 
involvement in the uncertain state where the adoption of collective action clauses is a 
purely voluntary decision by sovereigns and their creditors, with no real IMF 
involvement, and where the implications of these clauses for future crisis resolution 
remain highly uncertain.   
 
One possible way in which future debt crises may unfold, which we believe would be 
highly undesirable, is for a repeat of Argentina-type scenarios. As we have argued in this 
article, the experience of a laissez-faire approach to sovereign debt restructuring we have 
witnessed for Argentina in the past four years cannot easily be spun as a ringing success 
of this approach. On the contrary, the long delays in getting a deal hammered out that 
would be acceptable to a large majority of creditors and the extremely weak protections 
offered to creditors under this approach point to the merits of a more structured, statutory, 
method to sovereign debt restructuring. 
 
An important advantage of the statutory approach that we have emphasized here and in 
earlier articles is also that it makes way for the enforcement of a seniority structure for 
sovereign debt. The enforcement of an absolute priority rule would not only help mitigate 
debt dilution problems and concerns of over-borrowing when a sovereign approaches 
financial distress; it also, as we have argued here, would restore the effectiveness of the 
IMF in its central role as lender of last resort, without imposing new financial burdens on 
taxpayers. Again, corporate bankruptcy provides the natural analogy for describing the 
new role for the IMF we have outlined here under a regime of private sector involvement. 
The IMF’s new powers would be the same as those of a bankruptcy court in the case of a 
corporate bankruptcy, and would simply be to oversee emergency lending by the private 
sector (when this is desirable) by granting the new loans higher priority status.  
 
Ours is a simple proposal, which easily fits in with current practice and may not even 
require a radical revision of the IMF’s articles of agreement. We have outlined how the 
IMF would fulfill its role in practice and we have highlighted the important economic 
benefits of this new approach. Obviously, there are also concerns about this new policy, 
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some of which we have discussed above. One important concern about the IMF that we 
have not touched on is the governance of the Fund, its accountability, and the current 
highly politicized nature of its decision-making.  A discussion of this issue is beyond the 
scope of this article but is clearly relevant for our proposal. Indeed, an unreformed highly 
politicized institution could well do more harm than good in pursuing a policy of private 
sector involvement as we have proposed here.   
 
